Family breakdown and invisible homeless women by Song, Jesook
Family Breakdown and Invisible Homeless Women:  
Neoliberal Governance during the Asian Debt Crisis in South Korea, 1997 – 2001
Jesook Song
This article examines the relationship between the South Korean welfare 
administration’s reluctance to consider homeless women as deserving of state 
aid during the Asian debt crisis (henceforth the crisis) and the emergence of 
a pathologizing, popular discourse of family breakdown. Based on fieldwork 
I did in Seoul between 1998 and 2000, this article seeks to elucidate how 
the diagnostic discourses and prescriptive measures of “family breakdown” 
(kajông haeche or kajok haeche) proved congruent with a policy measure of 
selecting “deserving” homeless citizens defined as male breadwinners with 
employability and rehabilitating capacity. I argue that diverse social actors, 
including journalists, civic leaders, and government managers, enunciated 
logics of neoliberal human values; when social actors participated in the 
social governance of homelessness they relied on such logics to discipline 
gender and family relationships.1
Building on this analysis I conclude that social governance, particularly of 
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homelessness, provides an effective opportunity to understand the prevalence 
of neoliberalism in South Korea. Neoliberalism in Korea is not just an eco-
nomic doctrine promoted by international financial institutions or state 
administrations. Rather, the concept is better understood when we recon-
sider it as a social ethos that has gained wide explanatory power from various 
local actors. Although my argument does not imply that there was calculated 
complicity among various social actors, it does show that conflicting social 
actors can produce powerful coordination at a time of national crisis. In the 
South Korean case, activists did voice criticisms of Kim Dae Jung’s welfarism 
on grounds of its insufficient support for poor people. However, civil rights 
activists’ own activities devoted to social relief during the crisis echoed gov-
ernment policy. They too emphasized the need for beneficiaries to be reha-
bilitated within the confines of a normative family ideology. As a result, the 
“needy” subjects of the previous welfare regime were predominantly female 
citizens, especially mothers without family support. The “deserving” subjects 
of the Kim Dae Jung welfare regime, with the wide support of various civil 
forces, were breadwinning men with the potential of returning to or creating 
normative families.
Background of Family Breakdown Discourse
Before turning to the social welfare administration’s policy toward home-
less women, I begin with an analysis of the film Happy End (Haep’i endû) to 
illustrate the discourse of family breakdown that emerged so forcefully dur-
ing the crisis.2 An analysis of the film is central to my examination of how 
and why certain homeless people became “deserving” welfare citizens at 
that particular historical juncture. In the midst of the crisis, Happy End was 
one of the most popular films in South Korea. The film portrays a fictional, 
scandalous homicide as the consequence of an extramarital love affair: a 
man kills his wife for having an adulterous relationship with another man. 
The husband once worked as a bank teller but became a househusband after 
being laid off during the crisis. He appears to be unambitious and rather 
timid, dreaming only of simple happiness for his family. In contrast, his 
wife, Pora, is a successful and ambitious woman who runs her own after-
school learning institute for children. Although the film is set during the 
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crisis, when most private learning institutes went bankrupt, somehow Pora 
manages to keep her business prosperous and to maintain her big apart-
ment. The film climaxes when Pora agrees to her lover’s persistent appeals 
to go out one night, and to do so drugs her baby’s milk with sleeping pills. 
Pora’s husband, who has become gradually more suspicious of his wife’s late 
returns home, decides to kill Pora after he finds a remnant of a pill in the 
baby’s milk bottle. It is, in other words, Pora’s irresponsible motherhood, 
rather than her conjugal betrayal, that serves to justify the husband’s convic-
tion that he must kill her.
The narrative of an emasculated husband justified for killing his wife 
because she is an “immoral” mother is hardly new in Korean literary and 
cinematic history. Nam Jung Hyun’s text Letter to Father (Puju chônsangsô) 
is one such example.3 In this story a husband confesses to his father that 
he must kill his wife because she has aborted his son. The representation 
of emasculated husbands as a tacit metaphor of lost sovereignty — or post-
Korean War crisis — has been prevalent in Korean cultural texts through-
out the twentieth century. In contrast to earlier cultural texts, however, 
Happy End does not depict the female protagonist as explicitly evil. Rather 
it romanticizes her as an independent woman who can enjoy sexual plea-
sure but who has momentarily erred. Thus, Happy End reveals the changed 
expectations of women in recent South Korean social history. On the one 
hand, the film shows how South Korean feminism blossomed in the 1990s 
pursuant to civil rights activism that emerged after the culmination of the 
Democratization Movement in 1987;4 Pora, in this regard, emerges as an 
independent women aspiring to gender equality.5
Distinct from the pre-1987 political movements that featured collective 
activist opposition to the military dictatorship’s political oppression and cap-
italist exploitation of low-income laborers and farmers, the post-1987 socio-
political movements cultivated diversified civil activism. This diverse agenda 
focused on individual happiness and rendered the middle class a legitimate 
object of social activism.
During and in the immediate aftermath of the crisis from 1997, however, 
the feminist discourse on women’s independence was severely contested, 
if not subsumed, by the resurgence of a collectivistic-style activism in the 
face of national emergency. Not only did the women’s movement recede, 
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but women themselves were subtly reprivatized after enjoying a progres-
sive social environment over the decade leading up to the crisis. This is the 
social context in which the discourse of irresponsible mothers or wives as 
the cause of family breakdown increasingly appeared in newspapers, edi-
torials, novels, public forums, and films like Happy End.6 The discourse 
of family breakdown presumes employed men as the breadwinners of the 
family, women as the keepers of the hearth and supporters of their work-
ing husbands, and the nuclear family as the core of social well-being.7 This 
fundamentally conservative family ideology took as its enemy illicit sexual 
relations, rising divorce rates, and the emergence of same-sex unions.8 For 
example, newspaper articles took note of same-sex, couple-based families 
(tongsôngae kajok)9 and divorce among elderly couples (hwanghon yihon) as 
signs of family breakdown.10
The discourse of family breakdown is critical to understanding how 
“deserving” homeless people were conceived along gender and class lines 
at this particular historical juncture. Before proceeding to vignettes on the 
welfare governance of the homeless, I will briefly review the historical back-
ground of the Asian debt crisis and the political and social projects that 
converged in the South Korean response to it.
Contextualizing the IMF Crisis and the Kim Dae Jung  
Government’s Policies
The Asian debt crisis in South Korea began on November 21, 1997, when 
the nation became the object of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
bailout due to the lack of U.S. dollars with which to repay debts to foreign 
financial institutions. Major newspapers lamented the day as the “second 
national humiliation day” of Korea (the first being the Japanese colonization 
of Korea).11 This type of nationalist discourse urged citizens to protect the 
nation with donations, such as gold, recalling the early-twentieth-century 
movement to repay the national debt to the Japanese colonial government 
(kukch’ae posang undong).12 In South Korea, the crisis in fact came to be 
known as the IMF crisis. The label, ai-em-epû (IMF), itself was a conspic-
uous marker of the crisis and economic neoliberalization. As in the case 
of IMF homelessness or IMF unemployment, “IMF” denotes the involve-
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ment and negative impact of a foreign power within this national disaster. 
Although this way of referring to the crisis does not necessarily mean that 
South Koreans blamed the IMF, or any international institution, as the sole 
cause of the national emergency, it does speak to considerable ambivalence 
about the intrusion of a foreign power in South Korean sovereign matters.
In fact, the causes of the crisis are more rooted at the level of the Asian 
regional economy, if not globally. The crisis began in Thailand on July 2, 
1997, when foreign investors retreated from short-term and unhedged loans, 
fearing a currency hike after the collapse of assets and property market 
bubbles. The tendency to withdraw short-term investments rapidly spread 
through other Asian countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, and South Korea.13 It is interesting to note that Joseph Stiglitz, former 
chairperson of the World Bank, also criticized the role of the international 
financial institutes, in particular the IMF.14 Regardless of the different 
explanations about the origin of the crisis (whether caused by intranational 
weakness or extranational push, and whether voluntarily or involuntarily), it 
seems that many Asian regimes, including that of Kim Dae Jung, to various 
degrees decided to change both the reality and international image of their 
protectionist economies and establish neoliberal state policies.
As a condition for receiving IMF bailout funds, the South Korean gov-
ernment agreed to restructure its economic and financial systems along lib-
eral free market lines. These measures entailed the bankruptcy of many 
large companies (chaebôl) and banks, and led to large-scale unemployment. 
Importantly, the crisis occurred almost concurrently with South Korea’s 
political transition. In December 1997, a month after the beginning of the 
crisis, opposition leader Kim Dae Jung was elected the first civilian presi-
dent with no connection to military dictatorships. Although Kim Dae 
Jung’s victory was celebrated as a triumph for South Korean democratic 
movements and was endorsed by South Korean progressive political activist 
groups, the new president disappointed his supporters when his neoliberal 
policies contributed to a drastic increase in the unemployment rate. The 
1998 – 99 official unemployment rate was 8 percent, though many observers 
noted that using more realistic figures including women at home and stu-
dents who wanted to work, the unemployment rate was an astounding 20 
percent. Either figure is striking in relation to the pre-IMF rate of less than 
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3 percent.15 It is therefore all the more remarkable that President Kim Dae 
Jung orchestrated multifaceted reforms, particularly in the realm of welfare 
policy, with the support of civil activists.16
Kim Dae Jung’s achievement in this respect can be attributed to his effec-
tive deployment of liberal forces and policies. Before he was elected, during his 
exile in Britain, Kim Dae Jung had developed commitments to economic lib-
eralization and governmental restructuring as a means to limiting business- 
government relations and corruption.17 This focus was in line with the 
advice of international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World 
Bank and became more conspicuous during the crisis. A crucial example 
of the prompt realization of his commitments was his success in establish-
ing the Tripartite Committee (consisting of representatives from two labor 
unions, the biggest business association, and state administration). The com-
mittee made unprecedented decisions concerning workers’ layoffs.18
Further, Kim Dae Jung garnered the support of many long-standing 
members of progressive civic groups. This he achieved by mobilizing part-
nerships between governmental organizations (GOs) and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) when the government responded to the crisis. He 
expanded government funding for NGOs and nonprofit organizations 
(NPOs) and elicited their participation in sharing the responsibility for 
managing social issues to help unemployed and homeless people. NGO/
NPO’s collaboration with the government has roots in the Democratization 
Movement, which helped bring about the demise of the military regimes in 
1987. In a critical sense, the historical moment was not only the official end-
ing of military dictatorship and its enormous support for big conglomerates 
(chaebôl), but also the beginning of a decline of radical or dogmatically ide-
alistic political movements. On the one hand, the 1980s political movements 
resulted in pessimism about the efficacy of confrontational resistant activism 
against strict state law and chaebôl owners. Support for militant labor unions 
was weakening among blue-collar workers who watched the fragmentation 
of socialist regimes and who were afraid of undermining their companies’ 
global competitiveness. On the other hand, the 1980s political movements 
engendered a new generation of identity politics and civil/human rights 
activism in the 1990s. This new direction partially passed down the spirit 
of resistance toward diverse arenas of social movements beyond class, labor, 
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and reunification issues. Indebted to white-collar workers’ participation in 
general social issues, this new generation of social and civil activism was 
characterized by a greater awareness of the various aspirations of civilians, 
addressing middle-class, as well as lower-class issues. This double-faceted 
inheritance from the peak of the Democratization Movement coexisted in 
the surviving activists and civil groups of the 1990s. In addition, this inheri-
tance shaped progressive civil organizations’ relationships with state or city 
governments, causing them to become more diplomatic (meaning selectively 
militant or radical) as they appealed to a broader population that included 
not only the lower class, but the middle class as well.
In general, when civil groups involved themselves in labor and layoff 
issues, they tended consistently to disagree with the government administra-
tion, which suggests that civil groups had inherited and further developed 
the 1980s-style activism to some degree. For example, civil groups wrote 
complaint letters or collected mass complaint letters to the federal govern-
ment. They held relatively peaceful rallies and demonstrations in the streets 
and gathered support from international allies to pressure the South Korean 
government.19 In contrast to civil groups’ actions regarding state policies on 
labor issues, when drawn into welfare issues, they inclined to be cooperative 
rather than to resist the government’s plans. Of course, civil groups were 
not always complicit with the Kim Dae Jung regime. Many professionals 
and activists criticized the government’s response to unemployment issues, 
charging that it was focused only on reemployable people and sidestepped 
broader welfare policies for people who could not expect employment. Yet 
these same critics were actively participating — at the government’s invita-
tion — in partnership programs between GOs and NGOs. As previously 
mentioned, the government expanded opportunities and increased fund-
ing to support various NGO/NPO activities. In the past, under military 
dictatorship, there had always been government funding for NGOs, but it 
was granted only to NGOs affiliated with the official circle. The expan-
sion of recipients of governmental funds for NGO/NPO activities in the 
postdictatorship years was proposed and audited by a group of mostly non-
governmental experts, who were often involved with NGOs as voluntary 
consultants or board members.20
positions 14:1 Spring 2006 44
Homelessness: Policies and Politics
The climate of the Asian debt crisis gave rise to a new phenomenon called 
“IMF homeless” (aimepû nosukcha or siljik nosukcha). This term refers to peo-
ple, more accurately to men, who supposedly lost their means of subsistence 
and housing during and due to the crisis. The word for homeless people 
in Korean, nosukcha, is a neologism fabricated with the onset of the crisis, 
to distinguish itself from the existing purangin, a term that could be trans-
lated as “vagrant” or “vagabond.” Regardless of a longstanding and signifi-
cant population of people living in the streets, the category “IMF homeless” 
implied an entirely new phenomenon. Scenes of crowded homeless people 
residing in the environs of the Seoul train station were broadcast locally 
and internationally.21 Homeless people were portrayed as the most pitiful 
victims of the crisis. After seeing these pictures, many South Koreans, as 
well as Koreans abroad and foreign humanitarian groups, made donations 
to alleviate conditions for the homeless and unemployed. The IMF home-
less were particularly prominent because they were one of the first objects 
of attention of Kim Dae Jung’s welfare administration, and because never 
before had a South Korean government paid so much attention to homeless 
people as primary recipients or welfare citizens.
Seoul, where I conducted my research, was an optimal setting for observ-
ing the process entailed in the making of homeless policy because the nation’s 
homeless were centered in the capital. During my fieldwork period, I acted 
not only as an anthropologist, but also as an assistant to the Seoul Commit-
tee on Unemployment Issues, created in response to the crisis. Furthermore, 
I had been hired in that capacity as part of a Seoul public works initiative 
for unemployed citizens (konggong kûllo saôp). I myself was registered as a 
so-called highly educated, unemployed person (kohangnyôk sirôpcha). I was 
assigned the task of collecting data on social needs related to unemployment 
issues in cooperation with Seoul city managers. In addition, because the 
city had hired me to gather fresh data, I spent a great deal of time meeting 
experts, social workers, and quasi-governmental welfare agents who were 
involved in planning and executing emergency social policies, including the 
policy on homelessness.
To explicate the complex matrix through which “deserving” homeless-
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ness was measured, I need first to delineate the categories IMF homeless 
and purangin. I then turn to the question of how discourses supporting these 
categories managed to efface women. I portray South Korean welfare and 
moral governance through the diverse narratives of city managers, social 
workers, editorials, and civic activists. Although I appreciate that these actors 
occupy varied social positions and claim diverse experiences, they nonethe-
less collectively produced the new era of “deserving” welfare citizenship.
Particularly from the city managers’ narratives, I came to understand how 
it was that they distinguished IMF homeless from purangin. The primary 
criteria that demarcated IMF homeless as deserving subjects and purangin 
as undeserving were the desire to work and the intention to rehabilitate 
toward a “normal” life. According to Mr. Yang, a middle manager deal-
ing with homeless issues for the Seoul city government, “IMF homeless are 
people who came to be homeless, due to layoffs after the IMF crisis. They 
are normal people, not purangin. They have the intention to rehabilitate 
[chaehwal ûiji] and the desire to work [kûllo ûiyok]. As opposed to the IMF 
homeless, purangin have lived in the streets for a long time. Purangin neither 
want to work, nor do they have the possibility of resuming regular lives.” 
In fact, these kind of images were widely circulated by the mass media, as 
illustrated by the following article in OASIS, a newsletter for unemployed 
people:
Although 1998 was a time when the national IMF crisis had all citizens 
breathing hard and tightening their belts, everybody learned how to cope 
with difficult situations. But, with the severe economic blow that led to 
the bankruptcy of many conglomerates and to the layoff of many bread-
winners and to the breakdown of families, we also find an unprecedented 
number of nosukcha [homeless people]. There are two kinds of nosukcha: 
those originating from the IMF crisis and purangin-type nosukcha. The 
purangin-type nosukcha became homeless due to disease, heavy drinking, 
family breakdown, and unaffordable living expenses. Most of them are in 
their late forties or early fifties. They have lost their ability to labor as well 
as their hope for life; and they move between welfare facilities and street 
living. IMF nosukcha, on the other hand, became homeless due to family 
breakdown related to the IMF crisis. They are noticeably young and have 
the capacity to labor and the desire to work.22
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Social workers who met and lived with homeless people, however, contested 
this clear division between IMF homeless and purangin and also challenged 
the idea that IMF homeless can be easily rehabilitated. For instance, the 
head social worker of a well-known homeless shelter asserted that the gov-
ernment had been mistaken to order social workers to distinguish IMF 
homeless from long-term street-living people because in real life the distinc-
tion was fuzzy. That head social worker also questioned the government’s 
claims about rehabilitation within a short period. However, as we will see 
later, social workers who ran the homeless shelters did not problematize 
the idea that homeless people should be rehabilitated into being productive 
mainstream citizens, but rather actively participated in this mobilization.23
It is important to consider how it was that the policy on homelessness was 
chosen to be one of the first social policies implemented in response to the 
crisis. In general, social polices during the crisis accreted over time. Most 
were developed to address problems affecting those who had been subject to 
the employment insurance system prior to the crisis and included unemploy-
ment benefits, an employment stabilization program, a job skill development 
program, and a public works program. Although the employment insurance 
system drastically expanded during the crisis and came to include persons 
employed in workplaces having fewer than five employees, most recipients of 
the insurance during the crisis were people who were employed in privileged 
big companies who had previously enjoyed the option of having an employ-
ment insurance system and who had been laid off during the crisis. Thus 
unemployment benefits, including the job-seeking allowance and employ-
ment promotion benefits, were strictly limited to people insured before the 
crisis, and beneficiaries were mostly white-collar, middle-aged men at, in 
many cases, the managerial level. In spite of its limited application, none-
theless, the program’s direct cash benefits for the unemployed through the 
public works program were unprecedented. This same public works pro-
gram was also used to attract homeless people into homeless shelters with 
the artificial criteria of employability and potential for rehabilitation.24 I 
would argue that homelessness was effectively equated with or subsumed 
into the category of unemployment so as to exclude long-term street-living 
people. Thus, from the very beginning, President Kim’s welfare policy was 
conceptualized as “workfare” or “postwelfare.” Kim’s was South Korea’s 
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first self-proclaimed, long-term, planned welfare state. The abrupt emer-
gence of a workfare instead of welfare policy is, I argue, symptomatic of the 
establishment of Kim’s neoliberal state policy, which was amplified in the 
liberal atmosphere in South Korea. Although Kim’s administration had dif-
ferentiated itself from previous regimes by announcing the state’s primary 
role in securing individual and social well-being, in short, the government 
persisted with the idea that families remain the primary unit responsible for 
individual security.
The issue of homeless women further helps us understand the ways in 
which the appellation of deserving welfare citizenship is designated. Inter-
estingly, from the very beginning of these policies on homelessness, Seoul 
city managers assumed that there were no homeless women. Indeed they 
went so far as to omit gender in their statistics of homeless people. When 
pressed, city managers would later claim that the number of homeless 
women was negligible. They reported two hundred women out of a total of 
four thousand homeless people. According to Yang,
There is no such thing as homeless women. After all I didn’t see any 
homeless women. My job is really tiring. I can hardly sleep. But, I have 
become friends with IMF homeless, and sometimes I even drink with 
them. So, I know their agony very well. They lost their jobs, houses, 
wives, children, families, friends — everything. You won’t find any home-
less women, I’m sure. . . . [after a moment of pause] There are a few female 
purangin among the male homeless. But they are not IMF homeless; they are 
mentally ill. (emphasis added)
In this narrative, the city manager imagines the IMF homeless as stable 
home-owning male workers who sustained “normal” lives, including mar-
riage and a family wage before the crisis hit. This is congruent with the 
media representation of IMF homeless having middle-class backgrounds 
and of the faltering middle class, as the following article from the Han’guk 
kyôngje sinmun (Korea Economic Daily) reports:
The middle class is falling — it has lost its wings. Salary reduction, lay-
offs, property deflation, and sky-rocketing living expenses are chasing the 
South Korean middle class to the edge of a cliff. Until November 1997, the 
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middle class was full of hope. Newlyweds renting a single room in other 
peoples’ apartments imagined that after ten years of saving they could 
buy a sizable apartment. And they bought cars dreaming of themselves as 
rich people. And the stock market went up steadily until the IMF crisis. 
According to the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry, salaried 
workers have experienced on average a 32.6 percent wage reduction as 
a result of the crisis. Workers cannot afford to pay back the interest on 
their loans, let alone save money. And they have given up the idea of ever 
owning an apartment. The faltering middle class is most vividly revealed 
in the phenomenon of homeless people. Mr. Koh (thirty-four years old), 
who began living in Sôsomun Kongwon [West Small Gate Park], used to 
be a middle manager in a big conglomerate. He was laid off last Decem-
ber. At the time his wife began working as an insurance saleswoman. 
She ended up having an affair with the branch head of her insurance 
company and often did not return in the evening. Mr. Koh asked his 
wife to quit her job, but she instead asked for a divorce. He then left 
home, without divorcing his wife, on account of his children. In the Seoul 
train station, the Yongsan train station, and the city hall subway station, 
there are many street-living people like Mr. Koh, the so-called IMF-style 
homeless. The fact that these homeless men still have the intention to 
work differentiates them from foreign homeless who have ended up liv-
ing in the street because of alcoholism, escapism, and mental problems. 
Many South Korean homeless are “involuntary” street living people, the 
victims of bankruptcy or the sufferers of shame in front of their family 
members. The South Korean middle class is losing hope. The bedrock of 
our society is in crisis.25
IMF homeless women, on the other hand, were epitomized as purangin, 
the undeserving homeless. Here, I would like to recall that the dismissal of 
homeless women cannot be accounted for merely by gender discrimination 
because not all homeless men were considered deserving homeless either. 
However, it is interesting that while long-term homeless men were consid-
ered to be purangin by virtue of being lazy or resistant to “normal” life, 
homeless women were considered to be purangin because of their pathology 
or immorality. I turn now to the comments of Ms. Pang, a Seoul city lower 
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manager assigned to women in need of public protection. This is what she 
said to me when I asked if she knew about homeless women:
Do you really think that there are homeless women? I can’t imagine there 
being any homeless women. How can women with children run away 
from home and leave their children? Mothers cannot be that irresponsible. 
Women who do that could only be insane. And in the case of single women, 
they can live by selling their bodies [i.e., as prostitutes/sex workers]. So why 
would they have to live on the streets? (emphasis added)
With this moralistic, maternalist perspective, Pang judges women who have 
left their children to be inhumane and insane, regardless of their reasons for 
leaving their children or rational decisions not to return to that place called 
home. Entirely outside of this lower manager’s imagination is the possibility 
of single women without family choosing to live in the streets. That much 
is clear from her bluntly enunciated view that women are either sacred 
mothers or prostitutes. Pang’s remarks reflect a resurging conservative view, 
which refuses to legitimate the possibility that a divorcée or widow might 
decline to remarry or prefer to lead a single woman’s life.
In light of the fact that Pang’s responsibility was dealing with destitute 
women who had nowhere to go, including battered women and mothers 
out of wedlock, her comments are striking. Had she known that women 
who run away from home have often endured domestic violence, perhaps 
it would have been easier for her to imagine that some runaway women 
had become homeless only after women’s shelters and religious retreat cen-
ters failed them. Under the previous welfare system, mentally ill women 
without family were the objects of protection in the name of maternalism. 
In the current system the maternalism remains; ironically, however, using 
maternalist ideologies to pathologize homeless women, governmental man-
agers have become unable to count homeless women as legitimate welfare 
subjects. Selective deployment of moralistic maternalism is a symptom of the 
neoliberal welfare state that has shifted its definition of deserving welfare 
citizenship from “needy” to “productive” subjects. From the perspective of 
the state, productive subjects are those people whose activities result in the 
maximization of profit. This is the logic of the neoliberal state policy as 
it applies the principles of entrepreneurship. Not surprisingly, the “needy” 
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subjects of the previous welfare regime were predominantly female citizens, 
especially mothers without family support, while the “productive” subjects 
of the Kim Dae Jung welfare regime were breadwinning men with the 
potential of returning to or creating normative families.
I would like to return to my central argument by noting that state func-
tionaries were not the sole social agents who contributed to the moral regime 
of deserving welfare citizenship and the normative family. Liberal social 
governance relies on a wide social consensus or moral authority drawn from 
civil forces to legitimize democratic state decision-making processes, such 
as the formulation of a policy on homelessness. The cultural and political 
logics entailed in the demarcation of welfare subjects or the proper domain 
for moral discipline were widely shared by the media, experts from aca-
demics or research institutions, and civil activists, as well as by state elites. 
To recall my earlier discussion, the city manager’s negative deployment of 
moralistic maternalism to exclude homeless women from eligibility for state 
programs echoes the perspective of the discourse of family breakdown. I 
discovered in the process of my fieldwork that many self-employed home-
less shelter managers shared this conservative family ideology.26 They too 
blamed homelessness on nonnormative family situations and promoted the 
“normal” family as the best way to prevent homelessness. Newspapers and 
public forums reported that the biggest concern of homeless people was 
related to family matters (27 percent), rather than job searching (22.4 per-
cent) or securing shelter or food (0.3 percent).27 In discussing family matters, 
the majority of homeless people (30.9 percent) were reported to be suffering 
from fragile family relationships. Reports reveal clear boundaries allegedly 
separating “normal” from “abnormal” families. By privileging conjugal rela-
tionships in heterosexual marriages, reports divulge cultural assumptions 
that middle-aged men cannot live alone and should be attended by female 
sexual partners. Because the breakdown of the family was alleged to be 
the cause of homelessness and other social problems, the homeless welfare 
agency responded with a variety of rehabilitation programs. For instance, 
one homeless shelter offered match-making, co-wedding ceremonies, short-
term reunion events with relatives, and transportation and presents for vis-
its to families or hometowns on the holidays.28 These rehabilitation events 
were targeted to motivate homeless people to “resume normal life,” and to 
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promote the ideal type and function of family as the basic unit responsible 
for social needs.29 Marriages between homeless people living in homeless 
shelters were presented as successful stories during the crisis. High officials 
in government, as well as other political and civil leaders, repeatedly visited 
the few homeless shelters with the wedding scenes rather than the majority 
of homeless shelters without those scenes. This would suggest that ideal-
izing homeless men and women creating “normal” families had become 
politically valuable. Some South Korean scholarly observers noted that the 
sociocultural fragility the crisis set in motion was rooted in long-standing 
latent issues connected with compressed modernity and rapid industrializa-
tion.30 While I do not disagree, I still think it is important to note that most 
mass media as well as governmental and civil documents presented family 
breakdown as largely the product of the crisis.
The flip side of such moralistic maternalism celebrates the female home-
maker who maintains domestic cohesion through her responsible mother-
hood. In September 1998, an editorial in Hankyoreh sinmun, a progressive 
newspaper in South Korea, used John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath to 
equate the South Korean crisis with the Great Depression in the United 
States and to underscore that mothers are the central axis for holding family 
members together in dire times. As such, mothers need to make strenuous 
efforts to protect the family. The editorial’s emphasis on maternal strength is 
congruent with the anxiety and fear of family breakdown discourses and the 
tacit blame assigned to undutiful mothers, wives, and daughters-in-law.31 To 
promote women’s employment, the government implemented a policy privi-
leging responsible motherhood. It initiated policies of small-business loans 
only to exemplary mothers who had no men capable of breadwinning in 
their households. However, even these exemplary mothers could not access 
the benefits if they failed to get financial sponsorship from their closest male 
kin. Women’s legal eligibility is obviously bound to the patriarchal structure 
even when mothers are eulogized as central figures of the family.32
Civil-society activists with longstanding histories of antistate activism 
were no exception. They actively contributed to promoting the moral econ-
omy of a conservative normative family. Although some of them voiced 
criticisms of Kim Dae Jung’s welfarism primarily because of its insufficient 
support for poor people, their own activities emphasized the capacity of its 
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beneficiaries to rehabilitate within the confines of a normative family ideol-
ogy. At the onset of the crisis, Chaeya, the long-standing progressive political 
activists’ collective, mobilized a huge donation fund, called the National 
Movement to Overcome Unemployment (NMOU) (sirôp kûkpok kungmin 
undong ponbu). NMOU inherited its nationalist motifs from the Gold Col-
lection Movement (kûm moûgi undong) that was created at the onset of the 
crisis and operated various activities throughout the crisis. In 1998 and 1999, 
NMOU prioritized its charity distribution to poor people with rehabilitation 
potential and a commitment to self-sufficiency. NMOU also led the Pan-
National Network Movement (pômgungmin kyôrônundong) and the Move-
ment to Survive Winter (kyôulnagi undong) to help the unemployed during 
the winter by providing subsidies and food. Note that families were the ben-
eficiaries of the two programs, rather than destitute individuals, regardless 
of their belonging to families. Further, the fact that women’s NGOs were 
singularly assigned to take care of beneficiary families for the programs 
suggests not just individual women, but also women’s organizations were 
held to have moral responsibility as caretakers of the family. In other words, 
neoliberal welfare principles and conservative cultural logics operated as the 
major social engineering technology in civil activists’ actions as well.
Let me turn now to a brief example of the ways in which civic activ-
ists were complicit in moral governance through the discourse of family 
breakdown. In May 1999, mass media reported that the rate of domestic 
violence had drastically increased after the crisis. These reports were based 
on information provided by respected NGOs that ran hotlines and shelters 
for victims of sexual harassment and domestic violence. I was astonished to 
hear these media reports because when I had called the same agencies three 
months earlier, executives had denied any relationship between the rates 
of domestic violence and the crisis. It is interesting that issues like home-
less women were made invisible, while others such as domestic violence 
appeared anew. Ms. Hyun, the acting director of a leading domestic vio-
lence agency, told me about the relationship between the crisis and domestic 
violence when I had called three months earlier:
Well, I haven’t observed any influence of the IMF crisis on domestic vio-
lence. I am a little bit frustrated by everybody’s talking about ai-em-epû 
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[IMF crisis]. Domestic violence has existed for a long time independent 
from the IMF crisis. I don’t understand why people try to connect issues 
of domestic violence to social tides like the IMF crisis. We are busy enough 
counseling battered women on the phone, how can we worry about who 
is an IMF victim or not? (emphasis added)
In those early days, these important civil organizations for women’s rights 
were not paying attention to the crisis’s impact on women’s issues, except 
in the case of women’s labor issues. A few months later I observed a huge 
change in attitude: the crisis and domestic violence had become intimately 
tied.
I also suspect that the NMOU’s funding for the Movement to Survive 
Winter to women’s NGOs pressed the organizations to reconceptualize 
their social welfare concerns in relation to the crisis. We can thus observe 
how issues under the discourse of family breakdown begin to be seen and 
counted differently by various social actors. I would not assert that women’s 
NGOs and feminists completely disassociated women from family in the 
1990s before the crisis. Recalling the background of the family breakdown 
discourse in this essay, however, 1998 – 99 is a historic time, when revived 
conservative, collectivistic family ideology superseded a decade-long femi-
nist contest of women’s independence over domestication and privatization. 
Further, I do not want to give the false impression that responses to the 
crisis were consolidated by complicity and conspiracy among various social 
forces. We have learned already that civil groups deployed manifold strate-
gies beyond oppositional methods to negotiate with Kim Dae Jung’s gov-
ernment to maximize civil powers towards democratic social governance. 
The condition of national emergency offered full-grown civil forces opti-
mal context to participate in the implement of social policy because Kim 
Dae Jung’s government actively promoted partnership of social governance 
between GOs and NGOs. Like the women’s hotline example above, domes-
tic violence that was perceived as a separate issue from unemployment in the 
beginning became effectively staged as a crucial consequence of the crisis 
and deeply related to unemployment.
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Conceptualization of Neoliberalism
It is essential to acknowledge how I have conceptualized neoliberalism in 
dialogue with two different strains of research. These are neoliberalism as 
a macroeconomic doctrine of state policy, and neoliberalism configured as 
epistemology or social ethos. Much literature discusses neoliberalism in rela-
tion to shifting political power at the state-institute level, crystallizing key 
symptoms of neoliberalism such as welfare to workfare, Keynesian welfare 
state to Shumpeterian welfare state, Fordist industrial society to post-Fordist 
industrial society, privatization of state agencies, emphasis of civil society, 
reorganization of labor as “flexible,” and reprivatization of women. Espe-
cially relating to the “hollowed-out” state, the works of Bob Jessop, Jamie 
Peck and Nik Theodore, and Kwang-Yeong Shin have presented the con-
tours of changes in the mechanism of state power.33 “Hollowing out” liter-
ally means the state withdrawal of its power from society. Welfare states 
in Western European nations are a good example of this process. Whereas 
these states used to exert direct control and provision to the welfare subjects, 
the state found apolitical or private agencies to take over these functions, and 
the state began to fund more selectively through criteria like means tests. 
These observations correspond to the way in which NGOs have participated 
in policy and management of homeless issues during the crisis in South 
Korea by agreeing upon employable and potentially rehabilitated home-
less people as appropriate recipients of social care. An important point that 
scholars sometimes make, contemplating neoliberalism in relation to state 
institutional power, is that state control is expanded rather than reduced 
through outsourcing agencies and privatization.
While these works are helpful in terms of visualizing the changes of pol-
icy and of state control that commonly occur in various local nations under 
neoliberalism, it is unfortunate that the very meaning of neoliberalism is 
rarely conceptualized as a sociocultural logic.34 At best, these works treat 
neoliberalism as if it is self-explanatory and assume it to be an economic 
doctrine exclusively mobilized by state bureaucrats. This is unfortunate 
because the presumption leads analysts away from addressing the significant 
question of how neoliberal logic is enunciated by a variety of social actors, 
even though people often experience the measures of neoliberalism (e.g., 
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mass layoffs) as an oppressive imposition. These literatures criticize the state 
bureaucracy for its craftiness in devising neoliberal policies as a cost-effective 
and efficient way of expanding the state’s actual power to control state sub-
jects. However, the literature tends to overlook or discount the agency of 
civic leaders and lay people who participate in neoliberal social governance 
and state practices.
I cautiously recommend thinking of neoliberalism as a social ethos of 
economic-moral value that gains its explanatory power through a wide vari-
ety of social agents. I propose this as an alternative to considering neolib-
eralism primarily as an economic ideology or doctrine that is mobilized by 
an exclusive segment of social forces or agencies. The relationship between 
neoliberalism and global economic restructuring in pursuit of a free-market 
world economy is an obvious one. Similarly evident are the predominantly 
destructive effects of these processes on disenfranchised people and the have-
nots of society. In this sense, neoliberalism’s robust connection to suprana-
tional financial institutions’ tendency to force late industrialized countries 
to open their local economies to the world market is apparent. However, as 
Lesley Gill succinctly argues, the IMF or the World Bank cannot be held 
solely responsible for neoliberalization at the level of daily life.35 In other 
words, political power does not exclusively rely upon a certain social agen-
cy’s authority, nor is it necessarily destructive. Here, political philosophers’ 
articulation of neoliberalism, which builds upon Michel Foucault’s idea of 
liberal governance, is crucial to an inquiry into why and how neoliberalism 
is powerfully spread and practiced.
If we view these observations on the changing nature of political power 
from a top-down perspective (where bureaucrats are the ultimate actors 
fulfilling their duties of state planning), they might not look much differ-
ent from the aforementioned understanding of neoliberalism as an effect of 
economic doctrine. In other words, the state government might be viewed 
as strategizing policies that require the least responsibility and are most 
lucrative to the state administration, as exemplified in Jessop’s expression 
“bureaucrats’ entrepreneurization.”36 However, the excellence of Foucauld-
ian studies of neoliberal governmentality in this context is their elabora-
tion of power working through multiple focuses and agents. This concept 
of power underlies my argument that neoliberal governmental policies in 
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South Korea during the crisis were powerfully implemented because a lib-
eral ethos and vision of a better life had historical roots and gained explana-
tory power from people’s daily and political lives throughout the 1990s.
The South Korean people’s concept of well-being was not created out of 
thin air by Kim Dae Jung’s motto, “elevation of quality of living,” instead 
of quantity of living (i.e., economic wealth).37 As many scholars note, most 
South Koreans, from lay people to the president, realized the limitations for 
development regimes that emphasized rapid economic growth. The heat of 
the Democratization Movement certainly opened a space for voicing diverse 
desire for more civil freedom. Impressive examples of those voices include 
the unionization of white-collar workers, the proliferation of environmental 
and civil rights movements, and the mainstreaming of the women’s move-
ment (e.g., the development of anti-domestic violence activists, tensions 
between heightened levels of domestic consumption and the moral project 
to prevent excessive consumption, and the emergence of sexual identity poli-
tics).38
Predicated upon a Foucauldian understanding of liberal rationality and 
governing technology, however, anthropologists suggest that the key para-
digm for understanding the emergence of liberalism or neoliberalism is the 
pragmatic ethos of pursuing efficiency and effectiveness for optimal produc-
tivity.39 Challenging the presumption or predominance of liberal govern-
mentality as a Western or Eurocentric phenomenon, these scholars encour-
age exploration of non-Western contexts of neoliberalism. Building on their 
contention of West-centric knowledge production, this essay probed how the 
historical conjunction of the Asian debt crisis and Kim Dae Jung’s focus on 
the establishment of the first welfare state effected an intensification of lib-
eral social governance. Using the South Korean case, this article has asserted 
the aptness of understanding neoliberalism as a social ethos that transcends 
economic doctrine. This is relevant to a new direction for studying the state 
or social governance, which would eschew conflation of state administrative 
powers with the conceptual construct of the state. More productively, schol-
ars of the state could explore ethnographic and theoretical inquiries into the 
processes through which epistemologies and ideologies of social governance 
are elaborated, intensified, or weakened through multilateral social agents.
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Conclusion
I have argued that we need to think about the convergence of political and 
cultural logics if we are to understand how homeless women came to be 
rendered invisible and undeserving during the Asian debt crisis. At the level 
of welfare state policy, I have argued, neoliberal principles made short-term 
street-living men the only deserving homeless, while categorizing homeless 
women and long-term street-living men as undeserving homeless. Homeless 
women were, moreover, pathologized in the name of a moralistic maternal-
ism. At the level of social and moral governance, the media, experts, and 
civil activists contributed to reifying ideas about the normative family. The 
media forged seamless connections between the crisis and volatile family 
relationships, thus reinforcing the view that homeless women had aban-
doned the home and underscoring the idea that homeless women could be 
excluded from welfare eligibility. Civil activists did not challenge the neo-
liberal logic of the policy on homelessness. Nor did they question the moral 
governance that consolidated the normative family.
Indeed, Kim Dae Jung government’s welfare state conveyed an image 
of successfully “guaranteeing the minimum standard of living” through its 
inauguration of measures on homelessness. However, the administration’s 
“guarantee” was not of the state as provider to all homeless people, but of the 
state as a mediator that only targeted certain homeless people with proven 
employability. Disciplining welfare citizenship toward workfare citizenship 
in the interests of a long-term, planned welfare state, the Kim Dae Jung 
administration aimed to mobilize self-governable citizens who would not 
be dependant on the state.
The government’s goal, I have argued, was to foster the emergence of 
neoliberal welfare policy in South Korea, a crucial element to amplify a neo-
liberal ethos in the nation. Before the crisis, the institutions responsible for 
individual well-being in South Korea were family and chaebôl. In the past, 
the ideology that families should tend to all personal needs and be responsi-
ble for social and individual well-being buttressed the South Korean devel-
opmental state’s minimal enhancement of the welfare system. South Korea’s 
successive military, authoritarian regimes actively employed and reproduced 
the familistic and paternalistic social order. In addition, the chaebôl upheld 
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tremendous systems of employee allowances by extending family allowances 
to married employees, education allowances for children, housing allow-
ances, and owner-driver car allowances, and thus covered needs that might 
otherwise have fallen to the state.
These benefits demonstrate how the South Korean developmental state 
not only incubated chaebôl but also depended on them in a symbiotic rela-
tion. The crisis saw the Kim Dae Jung regime creating welfare as a scaf-
fold for securing the nation, following a “Third Way” tradition of workfare 
states mediating between social democratic and liberal agendas. It would 
not be accurate to say that the Kim Dae Jung regime merely enlivened exist-
ing partial programs and continued a basic structure. Major changes were 
made in the largest welfare programs. Health insurance, national pension, 
and employment insurance systems were all nearly universalized. Distribu-
tion of the services was effectively rearranged, creating conflicts among vari-
ous social interest groups (e.g., medical doctor associations and pharmacy 
associations, local health insurance agencies and private health insurance 
agencies, and, more in the general working middle class, the taxpayers, and 
government).
At first glance, the guarantee of a minimum standard of living appears 
contradictory to the economic emphasis of Kim Dae Jung’s welfarism. How-
ever, the logic of Kim’s welfarism is to optimize its governance by launching 
the welfare state at minimum cost. As a result, the responsibility of family 
units for their members’ economic and welfare security was not reduced. 
Rather, during the crisis, the discourse of family breakdown” tended to inten-
sify the family responsibility system. Using a national emergency to mobilize 
the public-private social management partnership with enlarged social/civil 
activist groups, the Kim Dae Jung government was able to make the social 
security welfare state a site for implementing neoliberal policies. Under its 
logic only employable male breadwinners open to being rehabilitated into 
normative familial life were considered deserving welfare subjects. 
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